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THE EXCEPTIO NON ADIMPLETI CONTRACTUS IN 




The position of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in public international law 
as a response to the breach of a treaty is surrounded by uncertainty. The present 
article aims to offer an analytical examination of I) the notion of the exceptio and its 
relationship to other responses to the breach of a treaty; II) the question of its 
conditions of application; and III) its character as a rule of international law. It 
argues that the exceptio is distinct both from responses according to Art 60 VCLT 
and from countermeasures; however, there is still uncertainty with regard to its 
conditions of application. It can be considered as a general principle of law and, as 
such, it can fill gaps in the regulation of responses to the breach of a treaty. 
However, it is not clear whether the exceptio constitutes a rule of customary 
international law. 
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The notion of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus in public international law 
remains disputed. It is unclear not only whether it belongs to the law of treaties or 
the law of State responsibility, but also whether it is a rule of international law and 
what are its conditions of application. This article purports to clarify the notion of the 
exceptio and its relationship to other responses to the breach of a treaty (Section 2), 
as well as its conditions of application (Section 3), and attempts to answer the 
question of whether it is a rule of current international law through an examination of 
the sources of international law according to Art 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (Section 4). The findings of this analysis are summarised in the 
conclusion (Section 5). 
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2 The Notion of the Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus in Public International 
Law and its Relationship to Other Responses to the Breach of a Treaty  
 
2.1 The Notion of the Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus in Public International 
Law 
 
The exceptio non adimpleti contractus (also referred to as exceptio or exception of 
non-performance)1 is, as the term exceptio denotes, a means of legal defence2 
according to which a party to a treaty can withhold performance of an obligation 
arising therefrom for so long as the other party has not performed a synallagmatic 
(derived from the Greek word συνάλλαγμα, which in antiquity had the meaning of 
contract or covenant) obligation under the treaty; in such a case, the one obligation 
constitutes an exchange for the other. The exceptio stems from the broader principle 
inadimplenti non est adimplendum,3 according to which a party to a treaty need not 
perform its obligations under that treaty if the other party to the treaty does not 
perform its own obligations. Actually, there is often confusion between the exceptio 
and the broader principle;4 however, the principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum 
is considered as encompassing, apart from the exceptio non adimpleti contractus, 
other responses to the breach of a treaty, which are not restricted to synallagmatic 
obligations, namely the termination or the suspension of the operation of a treaty in 
whole or in part in response to its material breach, according to Art 60 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).5   
                                                 
1 See generally James Crawford and Simon Olleson, “The Exception of Non-Performance: Links 
between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility”, 21 AustYBIL (2000) pp. 55-74; 
DW Greig, “Reciprocity, Proportionality and the Law of Treaties”, 34 VJIL (1994) pp. 295-403; 
Joseph Nisot,  “L’exception ‘Non Adimpleti Contractus’ en Droit International”, 74 RGDIP (1970), 
pp. 668-73; Danae Azaria, “Exception of Non-Performance”, MPEPIL online (last updated February 
2015) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e2130?rskey=vScKtx&result=1&prd=EPIL> accessed 18 April 2018. 
2 Georges Ripert, “Les Règles du Droit Civil Applicables aux Rapports Internationaux”, 44 Recueil 
des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1933) p. 605; Nisot (n 1) p. 668. 
3 International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
55th session’ (3 May-23 July 1999) UN Doc A/54/10 (‘ILC Report 1999’), p. 79 para 341; Separate 
Opinion of Judge Simma, Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v Greece) [2011] ICJ Rep 695 para 17. 
4 See for example Pleadings by France, Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the 
United States of America and France case (1978) 18 RIAA 417 para 17; Special Rapporteur 
Riphagen, Preliminary report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility, 
ILCYB 1980-II (‘Riphagen I’), p. 118 para 58. 
5 Adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 (1155 UNTS 331). See Bruno Simma, 
“Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Its Background in 
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The principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum is itself crystallisation of the 
negative aspect of the general principle of reciprocity,6 which justifies a response 
affecting an obligation identical or equivalent to that breached. In Art 60 VCLT this 
is to a certain extent reflected in the requirement that the treaty which is terminated 
or the operation of which is suspended must be the same as that which is materially 
breached. Of course, according to the letter of Art 60 VCLT, in case of partial 
termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty, the provision which is 
terminated or the operation of which is suspended need not necessarily be the one 
which has been materially breached, but can be another provision of the same 
treaty,7 contrary to the exceptio, which only permits the non-performance of an 
obligation corresponding to that which is not performed by the other party. The 
exceptio is therefore a corollary of the principle of reciprocity8 in its strictest version. 
 
2.2 The Exceptio in the Work of the International Law Commission 
 
The question whether the exceptio non adimpleti contractus should be included 
among responses to the breach of a rule of international law was posed in the 
codifications of both the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility by the 
International Law Commission (‘ILC’). Nevertheless, the course of the examination 
of the exceptio by the ILC has been tortuous. 
During the codification of the law of treaties, Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice 
included in his Fourth Report the exceptio among responses to the breach of a treaty. 
Although he envisaged ‘a general international law rule of reciprocity’ operating 
with regard to any international obligation, regardless of its source, and justifying 
‘ab extra, by operation of a general rule of international law’ that ‘the failure of one 
State to perform its international obligations in a particular respect, will either entitle 
other States to proceed to a corresponding non-performance in relation to that State, 
or will at any rate disentitle that State from objecting to such corresponding non-
                                                                                                                                          
General International Law”, 20 ÖZöR (1970) p. 20; Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz, Third report 
on State responsibility, ILCYB 1991-II (‘Arangio-Ruiz III’) pp. 13-14. 
6 Michel Virally, “Le principe de réciprocité dans le droit international contemporain”, 122 Recueil 
des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1967) p. 51; Simma (n 5) p. 8. 
7 See also Art 44 (2) VCLT. 
8 Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, FYROM v Greece para 10; Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad 
hoc Roucounas, FYROM v Greece para 66; Elisabeth Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An 
Analysis of Countermeasures (1984) pp. 14-15; Greig (n 1) pp. 320-1. 
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performance’, he considered that the non-performance more specifically of a treaty 
can be justified ‘ab intra, by the operation of a condition which, whether it is 
actually expressed in a treaty or not, is deemed by international law to be implied, 
either in all treaties, or in the particular class to which the treaty concerned 
belongs’.9 He thus proposed a draft article stipulating that ‘By virtue of the principle 
of reciprocity […] non-performance of a treaty obligation by one party to the treaty 
will, so long as such non-performance continues, justify an equivalent and 
corresponding non-performance by the other party or parties’.10 This ‘equivalent and 
corresponding non-performance’ was also included in the section ‘Modalities of 
redress for breaches of treaty’ of the same report, as distinct from the other responses 
to the breach of a treaty.11 Although Fitzmaurice did not use the term ‘exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus’, the response to which he refers clearly corresponds to the 
notion of the exceptio.  
By contrast, Special Rapporteur Waldock did not deal with issues of performance 
of treaty obligations in his reports on the law of treaties. He seems to have equated 
the ‘equivalent and corresponding non-performance’, to which Fitzmaurice had 
referred, with the termination or suspension of the operation ‘only of the provision 
which had been breached by the defaulting party’.12 This equation, on the ground 
that both termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a whole and the 
termination or suspension of the operation ‘only of the provision which had been 
breached by the defaulting party’ are applications of the principle inadimplenti non 
est adimplendum,13 does not square with the traditional meaning of the notion of the 
exceptio.14 As already explained, the exceptio is an aspect of the principle 
inadimplenti non est adimplendum different from that of termination or suspension 
of the operation of a treaty, and, contrary to these two responses, as it will be seen, it 
has the function of a defence and does not affect the force of the treaty.15 
                                                 
9 Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice, Fourth report on the Law of Treaties, ILCYB 1959-II 
(‘Fitzmaurice IV’) p. 44, draft art 11 (2); ibid, p. 70 para 102 (emphasis in the text). 
10Ibid, p. 46, draft art 20 (1).  
11 Ibid, pp. 50-1, draft art 37 (d).  
12 Special Rapporteur Waldock, Second report on the Law of Treaties, ILCYB 1963-II (‘Waldock 
II’), p. 76 para 14. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See above, Section 2.1. 
15 See below, Section 2.4. 
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In any event, presumably because of this equation and because of the omission of 
issues of performance of treaty obligations from the reports of the ILC,16 the 
principle did not eventually find its way into the VCLT. It must however be noted 
that during the discussions in the ILC, several members of the Commission pointed 
out the omission of the exceptio from the draft articles of the ILC on the law of 
treaties. Bartoš referred to the ‘rule do ut des’ in the law of treaties, pointing out that 
treaties often contain provisions under which ‘one State could not demand of another 
something that it refused to accord itself, contrary to the provisions of the treaty...’.17 
Furthermore, Reuter referred, separately from the suspension of the operation of a 
treaty, to the ‘principle of reciprocity, on which the draft [the 1966 ILC draft articles] 
as it stood was perhaps rather reticent.’18 In response to this comment, Rosenne 
stated that he considered that the principle of reciprocity in treaty obligations had 
been covered in the draft articles, but that the point raised by Reuter should be 
examined by the ILC.19 Such examination did not take place in either the 
Commission or the Vienna Conference. Thus, there was no clear agreement in the 
ILC that Art 60 VCLT had covered the notion of the exceptio. 
However, during the codification of the law of State responsibility by the ILC 
there were again proposals for the inclusion of the exceptio among responses to the 
breach of international obligations. Special Rapporteur Riphagen in his Fourth 
Report initially took the position that ‘the rule of reciprocity of obligations’ (from 
which, as already seen,20 the exceptio is derived) is distinct from countermeasures,21 
as well as from the suspension of the operation of a treaty. He referred to such a rule 
as ‘reciprocity stricto sensu’,22 which justified the non-fulfilment of an obligation by 
a party in case of breach of a synallagmatic obligation;23 therefore it becomes clear 
that he referred to the exceptio. Eventually however, he considered that this notion of 
                                                 
16 With the exception of what became Art 26 VCLT. 
17 ILC, Summary Record of the 692nd meeting, ILCYB 1963-I (‘UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.692’) para 30. 
18 ILC, Summary Record of the 848th meeting, ILCYB 1966-I para 36. 
19 Ibid, para 45. 
20 See above, Section 2.1. 
21 Special Rapporteur Riphagen, Fourth report on the content, forms and degrees of international 
responsibility, ILCYB 1983-II (‘Riphagen IV’), pp. 17-8 para 95.  
22 Ibid, p. 22 para 118. 
23 Ibid, p. 19 para 103. 
6 
 
reciprocity created a separate category of countermeasures and proposed a relevant 
draft article.24   
Although he admitted that the distinction between such ‘reciprocity’25 and 
reprisals (namely countermeasures) is a difficult one, he still thought that it had to be 
made in order to reflect the difference between the two responses in State practice.26 
This view received support from some members of the ILC.27 Nevertheless, it needs 
to be clarified that the notion of ‘reciprocal countermeasures’ proposed by Riphagen 
(contrary to his initial proposal which distinguished between ‘reciprocity’ and 
countermeasures) departs from the concept of the exceptio, which is distinct from 
countermeasures.28 It is interesting in this regard to cite the remark by Reuter in the 
discussions of the ILC: he also considered that there was no clear distinction 
between ‘reciprocity’ and ‘reprisals’ and noted that  
…there might exist a grey area between those two concepts if the principle of 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus had been adopted by the Special Rapporteur; 
however, that principle had been eliminated, and rightly so, if only because of its 
highly conventional connotations. The Commission had decided that the rules to 
be drawn up would not be attached to the source of responsibility.29  
Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz also seems to have considered responses based 
on reciprocity as a form of countermeasures.30 Eventually, the idea of ‘reciprocal 
countermeasures’ was rejected by the ILC on the ground of the difficulty of 
distinction from non-reciprocal countermeasures.31 Therefore it was considered that 
the former did not deserve special treatment as a distinct category of 
countermeasures: they were viewed as a particular application of the broader concept 
of reciprocity which extended to various areas of international law and it was 
                                                 
24 Special Rapporteur Riphagen, Fifth report on the content, forms and degrees of international 
responsibility, ILCYB 1984-II (‘Riphagen V’) p. 3, draft art 8. 
25 The word is used in quotation marks because the notion of reciprocity, as already seen (Section 
2.1), normally has a broader meaning. 
26 ILC, Summary Record of the 1891st meeting, ILCYB 1985-I para 20. 
27 See for example Sinclair (ILC, Summary Record of the 1895th meeting, ILCYB 1985-I para 8). 
See however for instance Reuter (ILC, Summary Record of the 1771st meeting, ILCYB 1983-I para 
23). 
28 See below Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
29 ILC, Summary Record of the 1858th meeting, ILCYB 1984-I para 31. 
30 Arangio-Ruiz III, pp. 9-10 para 14; ibid, pp. 13 para 32. 
31 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 37th session’ (6 May-26 
July 1985) UN Doc A/40/10, p. 22 para 128.  
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suggested that they should be dealt with in the context of proportionality.32 Indeed, 
in the commentary to the ASR it is stated that ‘countermeasures are more likely to 
satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality if they are taken in relation 
to the same or a closely related obligation...’.33 
Special Rapporteur Crawford also rejected the notion of reciprocal 
countermeasures but considered that some version of the exceptio could be 
incorporated in Chapter V of the draft articles as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness.34 However he considered that there are two versions of the exceptio:35 
one broader, in the sense analysed in this article; and one narrower, according to the 
dictum in the Factory at Chorzów case, which requires ‘a causal link between the 
breach of the obligation by State A and its non-performance by State B’.36 
Considering that the broader form of the exceptio was covered by the termination or 
suspension of a treaty according to Art 60 VCLT and by countermeasures, Crawford 
proposed the inclusion only of the narrow form in the ASR.37  
Diverging views were expressed in the ILC with regard to the inclusion of this 
form of the exceptio; they did not seem to be restricted to the so-called narrow form 
of the exceptio but could also be considered as referring to the exceptio in its broader 
sense. They can be summarised as follows: first, several members of the ILC 
considered that the exceptio was covered by either Art 60 VCLT38 or 
countermeasures and therefore did not need to be treated separately in the draft 
articles.39 Second, although it was noted that the exceptio found support in the 
doctrine and was often cited by States, particularly in the field of international 
                                                 
32 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th session’ (4 May-24 
July 1992) UN Doc A/47/10 (‘ILC Report 1992’) p. 23 para 151.   
33 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 
Report of the ILC to the General Assembly on the work of its 53rd session, ILCYB 2001-II 
(‘Commentary to the ASR’) p. 129 para 5. 
34 Special Rapporteur Crawford, Second report on State responsibility, Addendum 2, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/498/Add.2 (‘Crawford II Add 2’) para 323. 
35 Ibid, para 326. 
36 Ibid; see Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 17, p. 31; see also Gabčíkovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary/ Slovakia) (Judgment) 
[1997] ICJ Rep 7 paras 107, 110; Art 80 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (adopted in Vienna 11 April 1980, entered into force 1 January 1988) 1489 UNTS 3. 
37 Crawford II Add 2 para 329. See draft art 30bis.  
38 See Simma (A/CN.4/SR.2590 para 42); Pellet (ibid, para 63) and earlier Tomuschat (ILC, 
Summary Record of the 1896th meeting, ILCYB 1985-I para 37). Contra Hafner (A/CN.4/SR.2590 
para 53). 
39 Gaja (ibid, para 48); Pellet (ibid, para 63). 
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economic law,40 it was considered that it would be dangerous to codify such a rule 
since it would give States the opportunity not to perform a synallagmatic obligation 
without having to go through the limitations on countermeasures.41 Given this mixed 
reception, Crawford, who had already expressed similar criticism for the broad form 
of the exceptio,42 did not press the draft article on the narrow form of the latter.43  
Therefore, the principle of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus was not 
ultimately included in the VCLT as a legal basis for the non-performance of 
obligations arising from a treaty (though there was support for its inclusion by 
Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice and by ILC members) nor in the 2001 Articles of the 
International Law Commission on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (‘ASR’)44 as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness; ‘It could be 
said to have fallen between the two instruments’.45  
 
2.3  Does the Notion of the Exceptio belong to the Law of Treaties or to the Law of 
State Responsibility? 
 
Although the contrary view has also been expressed, namely that it is a 
countermeasure and therefore part of the law of State responsibility,46 the better view 
seems to be that the exceptio constitutes the exercise of a faculty inherent in a treaty, 
based on the interpretation of the latter, according to which a party to the treaty can 
withhold performance of synallagmatic obligations arising therefrom in case of their 
non-performance by the other party.47 This is one of the main reasons why the 
                                                 
40 Hafner (A/CN.4/SR.2590 para 54). 
41 Simma (ibid, para 45); Hafner (ibid, para 56). See also ILC Report 1999, p. 79 para 340; 
Crawford and Olleson (n 1) p. 74. 
42 Crawford II Add 2 para 329. 
43 Special Rapporteur Crawford, Third report on State responsibility, Addendum 3, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/507/Add.3 (‘Crawford III Add 3’) para 366.  
44 ILC, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC 
to the General Assembly on the work of its 53rd session, ILCYB 2001-II (‘ASR’). 
45 Crawford and Olleson (n 1) p. 56. 
46 Gaja (A/CN.4/SR.2590, p. 166 para 48); Hafner (ibid, para 53). In literature see Arnold McNair, 
The Law of Treaties (1961) p. 573, who however was not categorical; MM Gomaa, Suspension or 
Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach (1996) p. 13; Omer Yousif Elagab, The Legality of 
Non-forcible Counter-Measures in International Law (1988) pp. 45-6; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (2011) p. 194. 
Caroline Laly-Chevalier, La violation du traité (2005) p. 421 considers that measures of reciprocity 
can be considered as part of both the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility. 
47 Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, FYROM v Greece para 20. For an instance of State practice 
see Austria, UNGA Sixth Committee (54th Session) ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 51st session’ 
(20 December 1999) UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.22 para 14. In the works of the ILC see Fitzmaurice IV, p. 
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exceptio was not included in the ASR:48 the exception of non-performance was 
eventually seen as ‘a specific feature of certain mutual or synallagmatic obligations 
and not a circumstance precluding wrongfulness’,49 namely in the case of the 
exceptio the non-performance of the obligation is not wrongful and excused but State 
A is under no obligation to comply in the absence of State B’s performance of the 
related obligation.50 Although the general rule of reciprocity could also apply with 
regard to customary international law obligations,51 it is arguable that the restriction 
of the notion of the exceptio to synallagmatic treaty obligations is in accordance with 
its origin in domestic contract laws52 and is explained by the concept that in 
synallagmatic obligations the performance by a party is the causa of the performance 
by the other.53 Therefore, the non-performance of a treaty obligation in response to 
non-performance of a synallagmatic obligation by the other party cannot be 
considered as an internationally wrongful act. Since the ASR codify the general rules 
on State responsibility, regardless of the conventional or customary origin of the 
international obligation breached,54 the exceptio (being associated with the law of 
treaties) could not be included among them.55 
 
2.4  The Relationship of the Exceptio With Other Responses to the Breach of a 
Treaty According to the VCLT and ASR 
 
The exceptio is distinct both from the termination and the suspension of the 
operation of a treaty in response to its material breach according to Art 60 VCLT and 
from countermeasures according to Arts 49 et seq ASR.56  
                                                                                                                                          
66 para 82; Crawford III Add 3 paras 364, 366; ILC Report 1999, p. 79 para 341. For literature see 
Nisot (n 1) p. 668; Hugh Thirlway, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1960-1989” 63 BYBIL (1993) p. 41; Greig (n 1) pp. 399-400.  
48James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (2013) pp. 276-7. 
49 Commentary to the ASR, p. 72 para 9. Cf however FYROM v Greece para 161; Crawford (n 48) 
p. 679. 
50 See also Crawford III Add 3 para 364; Kabatsi (A/CN.4/SR.2591 para 12). 
51 See Fitzmaurice IV, p. 70 para 102. 
52 See Section 4.2. Similarly Azaria (n 1) para 1.  
53 In domestic legal systems it is considered that, in synallagmatic obligations, the performance by 
the one party is the cause for the performance by the other (Henri Capitant, De la Cause des 
Obligations (1927) pp. 27-9; Crawford and Olleson (n 1) p. 72).  
54 Art 12 ASR. 
55 See also Reuter (n 29). 
56 On the relationship between responses to the breach of a treaty see also Bruno Simma and 
Christian J Tams, “Reacting against Treaty Breaches”, in DB Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to 
Treaties (2012) pp. 576-604; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, “Material Breach of Treaty: Some Legal Issues”, 
6 ARIEL (2001) pp. 3-44. 
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On the one hand, the exceptio operates as a defence and does not affect the legal 
force of the treaty, like termination or suspension according to Arts 70 (1)(a) and 72 
(1)(a) VCLT.57 Therefore, it is not covered by Art 42 (2) VCLT, according to which 
‘the termination of a treaty… may take place only as a result of the application of the 
provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention [the VCLT]. The same rule 
applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.’ Moreover, the exceptio does not 
require a material breach,58 contrary to Art 60 VCLT, and it is restricted to 
synallagmatic obligations, while in Art 60 VCLT, in the event of partial termination 
or suspension of the operation of a treaty in response to its material breach, the 
provision which is terminated or the operation of which is suspended need not 
necessarily be the one which has been materially breached, but can be another 
provision of the same treaty. Furthermore, the exceptio does not seem to be 
submitted to procedural conditions, contrary to the cumbersome procedure of Arts 
65-8 and Annex VCLT which is provided for Art 60 VCLT.59 Thus, although 
according to the analysis in the previous sections the exceptio belongs to the law of 
treaties, it is distinct from the termination of a treaty or the suspension of its 
operation according to Art 60 VCLT. 
On the other hand, the exceptio is distinct from countermeasures,60 which are part 
of the law of State responsibility and are also a possible response to the breach of a 
treaty. Although it shares with countermeasures the legal character of a defence, it is 
again restricted to synallagmatic treaty obligations, contrary to countermeasures,61 
which can be taken in response to the breach of any international obligation. 
Of course, in practice it might not be easy to make the distinction, particularly 
among the various temporary measures in response to the breach of a treaty, such as 
the exceptio, the suspension of the operation of a treaty or countermeasures.62 It is 
true that if the exceptio is accepted in international law ‘…part of the function 
                                                 
57 See also Fitzmaurice II, 30 draft art 18 (2); Crawford (A/CN.4/SR.2590 para 44). For State 
practice see FYROM v Greece (Counter-Memorial of Greece) (19 January 2010) para 8.11. For 
literature see Zoller (n 8) pp. 27-8; Thomas Giegerich, ‘Article 60’, in O Dörr and K Schmalenbach 
(eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary (2012) p. 1043.  
58 See Section 3. 
59 See also Crawford II Add 2 para 325. For the conditions of application of the exceptio see also 
below Section 3. 
60 Simma (A/CN.4/SR.2590 para 43). 
61 Special Rapporteur Crawford, Second report on State responsibility, Addendum 4, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/498/Add.4 (‘Crawford II Add 4’) para 383. 
62 See also Crawford (n 48) pp. 675-6. See for example the Memorandum of the US Department of 
State Legal Adviser Davis Robinson on the application of the Treaty of Amity to expropriations in 
Iran, 13 October 1983 (1983) 22 ILM 1406, p. 1407. 
11 
 
performed by countermeasures could be excluded, at least in the context of treaty 
relations.’63 In fact, it might be argued that the responding State should, if the 
obligation breached is synallagmatic in relation to another, preferably resort to the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus. If that ‘would not constitute an adequate remedy, 
or would not be practicable’ there could be resort to countermeasures,64 which are 
not restricted to the non-performance of synallagmatic obligations. Since it is 
restricted to the non-performance of synallagmatic obligations, the exceptio does not 
attract the criticism often associated with countermeasures; indeed, as Crawford has 
noted, ‘a legal system might reject countermeasures, self-help other than in self-
defence and reprisals but still find a role for the exceptio.’65  
 
3 The Question of the Conditions of Application of the Exceptio Non Adimpleti 
Contractus  
 
There is uncertainty regarding the conditions of application of the exceptio, as they 
have never been codified in an international instrument and no international court or 
tribunal has examined them in depth. However, elements for the identification of the 
conditions of application of the exceptio can be found in State practice,66  
international case law and the works of the ILC on the basis of the notion of the 
exceptio in the domestic laws of many States. The following remarks might be made. 
The exceptio non adimpleti contractus can be resorted to in case of any breach of a 
synallagmatic obligation arising from a treaty. A material breach is not required,67 
although the exceptio could also apply in case of material breach, since nothing 
seems to preclude its application in such a case and since, as already mentioned,68 it 
is distinct from responses codified in Art 60 VCLT. Nonetheless, since a breach is 
required, it must be clarified that a restrictive interpretation of a treaty by a State 
party thereto following such an interpretation by another State party, which is not 
perceived by either party as a breach of that treaty, does not constitute an application 
                                                 
63 Crawford and Olleson (n 1) p. 57. 
64 Fitzmaurice IV, p. 45, draft art 18 (1). See also Riphagen IV, p. 23 para 123. Cf Commentary to 
the ASR, p. 129 para 5. 
65 Crawford II Add 2 para 323. 
66 See below Section 4.1. 
67 Fitzmaurice IV, p. 69 footnote 105, Case 3; Crawford II Add 2 para 325; FYROM v Greece 
(Counter-Memorial of Greece) (19 January 2010) para 8.28. 
68 See Section 2.4. 
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of the exceptio.69 However, it is arguable that the breach need not be an 
internationally wrongful act.70 As already stated, the exceptio only permits the non-
performance of an obligation synallagmatic to that which has not been performed by 
the defaulting party; moreover, there needs to be a connection between such non-
performances.71  
Of course, the crucial question which arises is the definition of a synallagmatic 
obligation. Such an obligation has been described as one ‘equivalent and 
corresponding’72 to that breached; one which would ‘correspond to, or [is] directly 
connected with, the obligation breached’,73 in the sense that it is ‘either a 
precondition or a concurrent condition to the performance of the same or a related 
obligation by the other party’.74  
Whether such a relationship exists between two treaty obligations is a matter of 
treaty interpretation and obviously involves an important element of subjectivity, 
which is bound to create problems in the application of the exceptio. It may be that in 
some cases the identification of synallagmatic obligations will be an easy task, but in 
others the issue of whether a treaty obligation is ‘corresponding’ or ‘equivalent’ to 
another might create problems. For example, Greece claimed in the FYROM v 
Greece case that ‘…what is synallagmatic is the agreement as such or as a whole, not 
the specific or individualized rights and obligations that flow from its provisions,’75 
which was disputed by FYROM.76 It may be pointed out that in the majority of State 
practice the application of the exceptio seems to be restricted to treaty obligations 
strictly corresponding to those which are not performed.77 Judge Bennouna in his 
declaration in the FYROM v Greece case has also supported a strict notion of 
                                                 
69 Special Rapporteur Riphagen, Sixth report on the content, forms and degrees of international 
responsibility, ILCYB 1985-II, p. 17 para 22, who considers this as a measure of retorsion; cf Reuter 
(ILC, Summary Record of the 1891st meeting, ILCYB 1985-I para 8); Flitan (ILC, Summary Record 
of the 1893rd meeting, ILCYB 1985-I para 3); see however Bartoš (UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.692 para 30). 
The distinction is also made by Sicilianos (Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Les Réactions Décentralisées 
à l’ Illicite: Des Contre-mesures à la Légitime Défense (1990) pp. 39-40). See for example Répertoire 
Suisse de droit international public (Éditions S.A. Bâle 1975) Vol II, Chapitre 4, 870-1, Letter of the 
Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police to the Federal Political Department, 6 July 1921, with 
regard to the 1882 France –Switzerland Treaty of Establishment, cited by Zoller (n 8) p. 15 footnote 
40, who nevertheless considers it as application of the exceptio.  
70 See Capitant (n 53) p. 282, who notes that in domestic law no wrongfulness is required. 
71 FYROM v Greece para 161. 
72 Fitzmaurice IV, p. 46, draft art 20 (1). 
73 Riphagen V, p. 3, draft art 8. 
74 Crawford II Add 2 para 318. 
75 FYROM v Greece (Rejoinder of Greece) (27 October 2010) para 2.19.  
76 FYROM v Greece para 117. 
77 See Section 4.1. 
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synallagmatic obligations.78 Besides, if it is accepted that the exceptio is not subject 
to procedural conditions of application,79 it needs to be as clear as possible what is 
the treaty obligation the breach of which gives rise to the exceptio: the content of the 
treaty obligations should be identical or their synallagmatic relationship should be as 
clear as possible, as not all obligations included in a bilateral treaty are necessarily in 
a synallagmatic relationship with each other. In short, the notion of synallagmatic 
obligations should be interpreted strictly. 
Such synallagmatic obligations are by definition those based on reciprocity, 
namely reciprocal obligations arising from bilateral or multilateral treaties.80 It has 
been argued that the exceptio could apply also with regard to interdependent 
obligations,81 since the latter are characterised by a ‘global reciprocity’.82 Of course, 
questions arise in this regard: first, whether the notion of synallagmatic obligations 
could include interdependent obligations, even if the latter are also based on 
reciprocity; and, second, whether the exceptio would be an appropriate response to 
the breach of interdependent obligations in view of its conditions of application, 
particularly the lack of requirement of a serious character of the breach83 and the 
alleged lack of procedural conditions of application. Interdependent obligations 
create an ‘all-or-nothing’84 structure in a multilateral treaty (for example a 
multilateral disarmament treaty), which perhaps should not be disturbed by 
application of the exceptio in the event of a minor breach. In State practice there does 
not seem to have been any instance of application of the exceptio with regard to 
interdependent obligations. Greig seems to correctly restrict the application of the 
exceptio in obligations ‘contained in a bilateral treaty or in a multilateral instrument 
creating bilateral relationships.’85 In any event, the exceptio certainly does not apply 
                                                 
78 Declaration of Judge Bennouna, FYROM v Greece [2011] ICJ Rep 709. 
79 See analysis below. 
80 For the classification of international obligations in reciprocal, interdependent or integral see 
Fitzmaurice II, pp. 30-1, draft arts 18 and 19. 
81 Azaria (n 1) para 1. Contra Riphagen VI, p. 12 draft arts 8 and 11 (1)(a), see however ibid, p. 13 
para 6. 
82 Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension 
of the Relations of International Responsibility” 13 EJIL (2002) p. 1135. 
83 Cf Art 60 (2)(c) VCLT, where a material breach is required, and Art 42 (b)(ii) ASR, which can 
be interpreted as requiring a breach of an interdependent obligation which is of a certain degree of 
seriousness (‘the breach of the obligation…is of such a character’) so as to radically change the 
position of all the other States to the treaty and to give rise to a response by any party to the treaty, 
even though in the ASR there is generally no distinction according to the character of the breach. 
84 Commentary to the ASR, p. 118 footnote 669. 
85 Greig (n 1) p. 381. 
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with regard to integral obligations86 (the legal force of which is inherent and not 
dependent on a corresponding performance by the other parties to the treaty) 
particularly obligations arising from rules of jus cogens.87  
The standing of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus does not present problems, 
as it is clear that the party to which the synallagmatic obligation is owed will be 
entitled to respond to its breach.   
It has been argued that in the case of the exceptio the condition of reciprocity 
replaces that of proportionality.88 Although it is true that the strict reciprocity 
required by the exceptio to a great extent ensures proportionality, the better view 
seems to be that proportionality should also be applicable with regard to the 
exceptio,89 since reciprocity guarantees the qualitative but not necessarily the 
quantitative proportionality.90 Proportionality is a general principle of law,91 which 
is therefore applicable both in the law of treaties, part of which is the exceptio, and in 
the law of State responsibility. 
Lastly, it is not clear which the procedural conditions of the exceptio are. 
Riphagen did not clearly subject measures of reciprocity to procedural conditions;92 
a similar position was taken by Arangio-Ruiz.93 There is support for the view that 
the exceptio is not subject to any procedural conditions.94 Indeed, in most instances 
                                                 
86 Fitzmaurice IV, p. 46, draft art 20 (1); Crawford II Add 2 para 327. With regard to the non-
applicability of the principle of reciprocity in international human rights obligations see Ireland v 
United Kingdom (1978) Series A no 25 para 239.  
87 Special Rapporteur Riphagen, Seventh report on State responsibility, ILCYB 1986-II (‘Riphagen 
VII’) p. 5 para 2; Crawford II, Add 2 para 327. 
88 FYROM v Greece (Counter-memorial of Greece) (19 January 2010) para 8.18; Azaria (n 1) para 
14. However it must be noted that the response by Greece could not be considered as disproportionate 
to some of the breaches invoked.  
89 Mahiou (ILC, Summary Record of the 2280th meeting, ILCYB 1992-I para 20); Arangio-Ruiz, 
(ILC Report 1992, p. 31 para 217).  
90 Sicilianos (n 69) pp. 274-5; Claudia Annacker, ‘Part Two of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 37 GYIL (1994) p. 239; similarly Laly-
Chevalier (n 46) p. 482. 
91 See Enzo Cannizzaro, Il principio della proportionalità nell’ ordinamento internazionale (2000), 
especially pp. 450-4. 
92 His relevant draft art 8 is not subject to draft art 10 on the procedural conditions of 
countermeasures (Riphagen VI, pp. 10-11). He nevertheless subjected also measures of reciprocity to 
his proposed compulsory dispute settlement mechanism for the implementation of international 
responsibility (ibid, p. 16 paras 14-7). 
93 Arangio-Ruiz III, p. 17 paras 50, 51, 58. 
94 Crawford III Add 3 para 364. See also Reuter (A/CN.4/SR.845para 26). For literature see Zoller 
(n 8) p. 126; Serena Forlati, “Reactions to Non-Performance of Treaties in International Law”, 25:3 
LJIL (2012) pp. 768-9, who nevertheless argues that while the procedural rules stipulated in the 
VCLT would certainly not apply to the exceptio, a notification of the intention to resort to it, 
analogous to the rule set forth by Art 52 (1)(b) ASR, might be an appropriate requirement. For State 
practice see FYROM v Greece (Counter-Memorial of Greece) paras 8.23, 8.26, on the basis of the 
character of the exceptio as a defence. In any case, Greece pointed to several situations in which it 
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of State practice on the exceptio there does not seem to have been compliance with 
procedural conditions, as far as it could be ascertained.95 Nevertheless, given the fact 
that in State practice it has also been disputed that there is a response to the breach of 
a treaty, such as the exceptio, which is not submitted to procedural obligations,96 the 
conclusion is that there is still some uncertainty as to the procedural conditions of the 
exceptio, although there is stronger support for the view that it is not subject to 
procedural conditions.   
Obviously, the conditions of application of the exceptio are less strict than those of 
the suspension of the operation of a treaty according to Art 60 VCLT and those of 
countermeasures. For this reason it has been argued that the exceptio presents the 
danger of evading the conditions of application of these two responses to the breach 
of a treaty according to the VCLT and ASR.97 This criticism is certainly justified to a 
certain extent, particularly since the conditions of application of the exceptio have 
not been adequately clarified on the basis of State practice by the ILC or in the 
international jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it could be argued, first of all, that the 
condition of the material character of the breach in Art 60 VCLT can also be evaded 
through resort to countermeasures and most of the procedural conditions of Art 60 
included in Arts 65-8 and Annex VCLT are in any case not followed in State 
practice,98 as particularly with regard to the suspension of the operation of a treaty 
they can be considered as too strict; and second, that if the above mentioned 
restrictions on the conditions of application of the exceptio are accepted, particularly 
the application of the principle of proportionality, together with all the above-
mentioned prohibitions of resort to the exceptio, the main difference of the exceptio 
from countermeasures is the presumed lack of procedural conditions of application 
of the former. Of course, in many cases it is quite likely that a warning will already 
have been sent through diplomatic channels, since States are not willing to risk their 
                                                                                                                                          
complained to FYROM about its failure to comply with its obligations under the Interim Accord 
(ibid, para 8.27). Besides, in domestic laws the exceptio is not submitted to procedural conditions (see 
Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Société 
Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID Case No ARB/81/2, Award on the Merits, 21 October 1983, 114 
ILR 152, p. 211 (‘Klöckner v Cameroon (Award)’). 
95 See Section 4.1. 
96 FYROM v Greece (Reply of FYROM) (9 June 2010) para 5.52-3. 
97 See discussions in the ILC (Section 2.2); Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, FYROM v Greece 
[2011] ICJ Rep 695 para 22.  
98 Simma and Tams (n 56) pp. 593-4; Jan Klabbers, International Law (2nd ed., 2017) p. 70. 
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friendly relations with other States, and in any case, as already pointed out, there is 
still some uncertainty with regard to the procedural conditions of the exceptio.  
 
4 Is the Exceptio non Adimpleti Contractus a Rule of Current International 
Law? 
 
Since the exceptio is distinct from both termination and suspension of a treaty 
according to Art 60 VCLT and countermeasures according to Arts 49 et seq ASR, 
and it is not included in either of these two instruments, the logical question which 
arises is whether it constitutes a rule of current international law. The ILC during its 
work on the law of State responsibility left the matter open by treating the exceptio 
as ‘a specific feature of certain mutual or synallagmatic obligations and not a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness’.99 Since it was not a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness, it was not relevant to the law of State responsibility and therefore the 
ILC did not need to take a position on whether it was a rule of international law. 
In fact, since the notion of the exceptio as a general response to the breach of a 
treaty is not incorporated in a treaty and therefore it does not fall within Art 38 (1)(a) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ Statute’), the question which 
arises is whether it derives its force as a rule of international law from the other 
sources of international law as reflected in Art 38 of the ICJ Statute, namely A. 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law (Art 38 
(1)(b)); B. the general principles of law (Art 38 (1)(c)); and/or C. subject to the 
provisions of Art 59 of the ICJ Statute, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law (Art 38 (1)(d)). 
It is true that Art 60 VCLT and Arts 49 et seq. ASR cover a great part of the scope 
of possible responses to the breach of a treaty. Nevertheless, if the exceptio is 
accepted as a rule of international law, it is still applicable on the basis of paragraph 
(8) of the preamble to the VCLT100 and Art 56 ASR.101  
 
4.1 Customary International Law 
                                                 
99 See Summary Record of the 2704th meeting, ILCYB 2001-I paras 10-14. 
100 See also Zoller (n 8) p. 18. 





In State practice from the 18th to the early 20th century there were several examples 
of application of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.102 Of course, early treaties 
were mostly bilateral and therefore the obligations they contained had a strong 
synallagmatic character. Nevertheless, there seems to be more recent State practice 
in application of the exceptio.  
First, such practice is reflected in the pleadings of States before international 
courts and tribunals and will be examined in the context of the relevant international 
case law.103 As it will be seen, this practice is inconclusive, as the invocation of the 
exceptio by one party to the case was often opposed by the other. To mention an 
example, in the Oil Platforms case the US invoked, inter alia, the exceptio as a 
response to an alleged breach by Iran of its reciprocal obligations under the 1955 
Treaty of Friendship with the US.104 Notably, it was emphasised that the invocation 
of the ‘fundamental principle of international law’ of the exceptio is not limited by 
countermeasures or by the termination or suspension of the operation of the 1955 
Treaty under the law of treaties; these were responses to which the US had not 
purported to resort.105 By contrast, in the same case Iran took the position that the 
exceptio has been codified in Art 60 VCLT,106 namely that it did not retain a separate 
existence as a rule of international law. Nevertheless, there have been examples of 
such invocations by States or international organisations which have not been met 
with a clear objection by the other party or parties to the case: for instance, in its 
reply in the Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry case before 
a WTO panel, the European Communities claimed that ‘even in the absence of any 
express provision to that effect, it is implicit in any agreement involving mutual 
obligations that if one of the parties fails to fulfil its obligations, the other party is 
released from complying with its own obligations’.107 In a footnote, there was an 
express reference to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus and it was added that ‘the 
                                                 
102 See Alexandre-Charles Kiss, Répertoire de la Pratique Française en Matière de Droit 
International Public (1962) Tome 1 paras 202-212, 215, 217-8. See also Chae Chan Ping v US 130 
US 581 (1889) (‘The Chinese Exclusion case’) p. 601.   
103 See below Section 4.3.1. 
104 Mathias, Counsel for US, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) 
(Merits) Oral Proceedings, 5 March 2003, CR 2003/18 paras 26.4, 26.7.  
105 Ibid para 26.9. 
106 Pellet, Counsel for Iran, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) 
(Merits) Oral Proceedings, 3 March 2003, CR 2003/16 para 7.  
107 WTO, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry- Report of the Panel (11 
February 2000) WT/DS139/R and WT/DS142/R [7.187]. 
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same principle finds expression’ in Art 60 VCLT; namely, the exceptio was not 
identified with the regulation in Art 60 VCLT.108 
Second, there are also some relevant examples in treaty practice.109 In many 
treaties, bilateral or bilateralisable, a provision is included which essentially 
stipulates that one of the parties to the treaty can withhold performance of an 
obligation for so long as the other/another party has not performed a synallagmatic 
obligation. Even if such treaty practice is not considered as extensive and uniform 
enough so as to give rise to customary international law,110 given also that most of 
these treaties are bilateral,111 it is nonetheless certainly a strong indication of relevant 
State practice. It could be argued that given the background of the exceptio in early 
State practice, such provisions, even if they do not constitute evidence of pre-
existing customary international law,112 could lead to the crystallisation of a rule of 
customary international law that has started to emerge prior to the conclusion of the 
treaty.113 It is true that the fact that States parties to such treaties decided to include 
therein a provision reflecting the exceptio might be considered as implying that they 
did not consider it as customary international law; however, it cannot be excluded 
that they inserted it for the purpose of legal certainty.      
Third, there are statements by State organs accepting the application of the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus as a response to the breach of a treaty. In 1990, the 
UK Minister for Public Transport stated that ‘when a foreign country, in defiance of 
international convention, has decided to exclude our aircraft from its airspace, it is 
naturally assumed that that country’s aircraft will be excluded from entering our air 
                                                 
108 Ibid, footnote 718 (emphasis added). 
109 See for instance Art 3 (2) of the 1953 Convention on the International Right of Correction (435 
UNTS 191), cited by Hans Blix and Jirina Emerson, The Treaty Maker’s Handbook (1973) p. 137; 
Art XVI of the 1948 Agreement (with annex) respecting regular air services (Argentina and 
Netherlands) (95 UNTS 21); Art 10 of the 1959 Agreement concerning road transport (Netherlands 
and Italy) (484 UNTS 309); Annex II Art 6 of the 1982 Trade Agreement (Mexico and Costa Rica) 
(1398 UNTS 185); Art 6 of the 1993 Agreement on trade and economic relations (Lithuania and 
Russian Federation) (1950 UNTS 373). There are many further examples in similar types of treaties. 
110 See indicatively North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 paras 71-4; Art 38 VCLT. See also ILC, Report 
on the work of its 68th session (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016) p. 78 Draft Conclusion 11 
(1)(c), ‘ILC Report 2016’.  
111 Although bilateral treaties are not excluded from the identification of customary international 
law, but their impact has ‘to be approached with particular caution’ (ILC, ‘Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its 67th session’ (4 May- 5 June and 7 July-7 August 2015) p. 47 
para 101. 
112 Ibid, Sections 20-1; ILC Report 2016, p. 78 Draft Conclusion 11 (1)(a).  
113 Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Section 26 (c), ILC Report 
2016, p. 78, Draft Conclusion 11 (1)(b). 
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space’.114 No reference to suspension or countermeasures or to any procedural 
conditions was made; moreover, although bilateral air services treaties often contain 
a provision according to which a breach by a party entails corresponding non-
performance by the other party, this statement was not based on a relevant treaty 
provision. Consequently, it can be argued that such a measure would be considered 
as a natural application of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 
Notably, the US in its comments to the draft articles of the ILC on State 
responsibility took the position that ‘a state may also be entitled to reciprocal 
measures, which are outside [draft] article 30’s definition of countermeasures.’115 
However, there were also some statements by States in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly on the work of the ILC on the law of State responsibility, which 
disputed the inclusion of the exceptio in the ASR or even its character as a response 
to the breach of a treaty.116  
Fourth, there seem to have been actual responses by States to the breach of a treaty 
which correspond to the notion of the exceptio. The following section does not 
purport to be exhaustive, but is indicative of the fact that there are responses to 
breaches of synallagmatic treaty obligations which do not seem to fall within the 
notion of suspension of the operation of a treaty according to Art 60 VCLT or within 
the notion of countermeasures. Thus, they might be considered as application of the 
exceptio with regard to synallagmatic treaty obligations. 
For example, on 21 June 1957 the United Nations Command in Korea considered 
that, in response to the alleged ‘gross violations’ of the provisions of subparagraph 
13 (d) of the 1953 Armistice Agreement117 by China and North Korea, it was entitled 
                                                 
114 UK Minister for Public Transport, Mr Michael Portillo, HC Deb 20 February 1990, vol 167, 
cols 171-3, cited in Geoffrey Marston, ‘United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1990’ 61 
BYBIL (1991) pp. 609-10. 
115 ‘International Claims and State Responsibility’ (1991-9) Digest of US Practice Intl L Vol I, p. 
1109.   
116 See Spain, UNGA Sixth Committee (54th Session) ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 51st 
session’ (29 October 1999) UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.21 para 19; Slovakia, UNGA Sixth Committee (54th 
Session) ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 51st session’ (1 November 1999) UN Doc 
A/C.6/54/SR.22 para 53, although it did not completely reject it. See also Topical Summary of the 
Discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its 54th session, on the ILC 
Report on the work of its 51st session (1999) (UN Doc A/CN.4/504) para 52, where it was also 
pointed out, inter alia, that the exceptio appeared to be a primary rule. Japan took the view that the 
exceptio could be included within the notion of countermeasures, although it admitted that it was 
distinct from them (UNGA Sixth Committee (54th Session) ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 51st 
session’ (1 November 1999) UN Doc A/C.6/54/SR.22 para 8). 
117 Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and 
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s 
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‘to be relieved of corresponding obligations under the provisions of this sub-
paragraph until such time as the relative military balance has been restored and… 
[China and North Korea], by its actions, has demonstrated its willingness to 
comply’.118 This appears to be an application of the exceptio, particularly since there 
was no reference to suspension of the relevant obligations of China and North Korea 
(thus it could not be considered as suspension of the operation of the Agreement) and 
there was no reference to countermeasures or, as the latter would probably be called 
at that time, ‘reprisals’.119  
In another case, Jordan issued in 1958 a decree excluding United Arab Republic 
(UAR) carriers from its territory, in response to the prohibition by the UAR of 
Jordanian planes from flying over or landing in the UAR.120 There was no reference 
to the suspension of a treaty as an instrument or to countermeasures and it seems that 
Jordan did not comply with any procedural conditions; at the same time, the 
obligation which was not performed can be considered as synallagmatic to that 
breached. Therefore this response seems to have taken place in application of the 
exceptio.    
Even shortly before the conclusion of the VCLT, the Legal Adviser of the US 
Department of State in his brief of 4 March 1966 stated with regard to the increase of 
US military personnel and equipment in South Vietnam contrary to the provisions of 
the Geneva Agreements of 1954121 that there is an ‘international law principle that a 
material breach of an agreement by one party entitles the other at least to withhold 
compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the 
defaulting party is prepared to honor its obligation’.122 Although it refers to a 
material breach, and it has already been mentioned that in the case of the exceptio the 
breach need not be of a material character, this response seems to correspond to the 
notion of the exceptio. At least with regard to the case of corresponding provision it 
                                                                                                                                          
Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice in Korea, adopted at Panmunjom 27 
July 1953, UN Doc S/3079 Annex A, p. 20. 
118 Communication dated 9 August 1957 from the representative of the United States of America to 
the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/3631, 4, cited by Sicilianos (n 69) 
p. 196. 
119 It was noted that the relevant measures would enable the United Nations Command to ‘take 
appropriate defensive counter-measures’ (ibid, p. 3), but not that the non-performance was a 
countermeasure. 
120 Cited in Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v Pakistan) (Memorial 
of India) ICJ Pleadings 25, p. 249. 
121 Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/node/1477. 
122 Cited by Quincy Wright, “The Termination and Suspension of Treaties” 61 AJIL (1967) p. 
1000. Emphasis added. 
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consists in the non-performance by the responding party of a treaty obligation 
synallagmatic to that breached; by contrast, according to Art 72 (1)(a) VCLT, in the 
event of suspension of the operation of a treaty in whole or in part, the parties, 
therefore not only the responding party, are released from the obligation to perform. 
It should be noted that there was no reference to the notion of countermeasures or to 
any procedural conditions of application which could support the view that such a 
response could be considered as a countermeasure. 
However, there are also relevant examples after the conclusion of the VCLT. In 
1970 the French Minister of Transport stated that the purported unlawful unilateral 
termination (therefore breach) by Italy of its 1962 Dimensions and Weights 
Agreement (with regard to vehicles) with France entailed a corresponding non-
performance by France; he did not refer to suspension, countermeasures, nor to any 
conditions of application.123  
Therefore, even though this State practice, which seems to be accompanied by 
opinio juris, does not appear to be general enough in order to give rise to the creation 
of a rule of customary international law,124 it still indicates that the exceptio has not 
been absorbed by Art 60 VCLT and that it is not identified with countermeasures. It 
cannot be excluded that there could be in the future State practice in support of the 
view that the exceptio is also a rule of customary international law. In fact, it is very 
probable that there are more relevant examples of State practice, which- particularly 
given the alleged lack of procedural conditions of application of the exceptio- are not 
reported in collections of State practice. 
 
4.2  General Principles of Law 
 
The exception of non-performance (exception d’ inexécution; Einrede des nicht 
erfüllten Vertrags) has significant background in domestic legal systems, as a 
defence to the non-performance of contractual obligations.125 It is recognised in the 
                                                 
123 Réponse du ministre des transports à Q.E. Philibert, 8 April 1970, cited in Jean Charpentier, 
“Pratique Française de Droit International”, 16 AFDI (1970) pp. 994-5. 
124 Art 38 (1)(b) ICJ Statute; North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 para 77. 
125 On the comparative law background of the exceptio see more analytically Crawford and Olleson 
(n 1) pp. 66-73. 
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contract law126 or in the jurisprudence127 of many countries around the globe. 
Moreover, although the Latin expression exceptio non adimpleti contractus is 
usually associated with civil law systems,128 in spite of terminological and other 
differences129 it seems that the notion of the exception of non-performance can be 
found also in common law systems.130 The notion of the exceptio can also be traced 
in international commercial law instruments131 and has been considered as part of lex 
mercatoria.132   
                                                 
126 See indicatively Europe: Section 320 German Civil Code; Art 1460 Italian Civil Code; Art 374 
Greek Civil Code; Art 262 Dutch Civil Code; Art 82 Swiss Code of Obligations; Art 328 Russian 
Civil Code; Asia: Art 66-7 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China; Section 51 Indian 
Contract Act; Art 533 Japanese Civil Code; Art 247 UAE Civil Code; Art 191 Civil Code of Qatar; 
Africa: Art 104 Senegalese Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations; Art 163 Libyan Civil Code; 
America: American Uniform Commercial Code section 2-703 and American Law Institute, 
Restatement of the Law Second Contracts (1979) sections 234(1), 237 reflecting the same principle; 
Art 1235 Argentinian Civil Code; Art 1092 Brazilian Civil Code; Art 719 Paraguayan Civil Code. For 
some further examples see Azaria (n 1) para 28. In such cases, it does not matter whether the non-
performance is wrongful or not.       
127 As in the case of French law (see Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract (2nd ed., 1992) 
pp. 213-6). For writers see the seminal works by René Cassin, De l’exception tirée de l’inexécution 
dans les rapports synallagmatiques (1914) pp. 1-33; Capitant (n 53) pp. 261-320. 
128 On the foundations of the principle in Roman law see Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations, Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990), p. 801 footnote 133. 
129 For example the fact that in common law there is no clear distinction between the termination of 
a contract and the exceptio (see GH Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Account (1988) p. 245). 
130 For literature see Treitel (n 129) pp. 244-317, who refers to it as ‘defence of refusal to perform’ 
and observes that, although the notion has a civil law origin, it has ‘functional equivalents’ in 
common law systems (ibid, p. 312); Neil Andrews et al, Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, 
Termination and Remedies (2nd ed., 2017) p. 82, para 5-018; Jan M Smits, Contract Law: A 
Comparative Introduction (2014) p. 241. Cf however comments of Staughton LJ in Channel Tunnel 
Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 609, p. 616. Crawford and Olleson (n 
1) p. 56 and analytically pp. 66-73 consider that the notion of the exceptio is better articulated in civil 
law systems and that it is not part of common law systems, on the basis that the latter produce similar 
results by contract interpretation and by the notion of conditional obligations. In the same vein Joshua 
Karton, “Contract Law in International Commercial Arbitration: the Case of Suspension of 
Performance” 58 ICLQ (2009), pp. 863-96, who however also notes that English courts do permit 
suspension of performance in certain circumstances and that the exceptio can be found in jurisdictions 
which are part of the English legal system but have a civil law origin, such as Scotland and South 
Africa (ibid p. 867): see in this regard Inveresk plc v Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd [2010] UKSC 19 
[36], citing Corbett J in ESE Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Cramer, 1973 (2) SA 805, p. 809 (cited by 
Robert P Barnidge Jr, Self-Determination, Statehood, and the Law of Negotiation: The Case of 
Palestine (2016) p. 133). See also n 126 for US Law.  
131 See Art 7.1.3 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010; Art 9:201 
Principles of European Contract Law 2002.  
132 See ICC Case No 3540, French enterprise v Yugoslav subcontractor, Award of 3 October 1980, 
(1981) 4 JDI Clunet 914, p. 920; Philipp D O’Neill and Nawaf Salam, “Is the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus part of the new lex mercatoria?”, in E Gaillard (ed), Transnational Rules in International 
Commercial Arbitration (1993) pp. 147-159.  
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Therefore, given this strong comparative law background, the exceptio might be 
considered as a general principle of law133 in the sense of Art 38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute, 
with particular application in the law of treaties.  
The problem of the function of general principles in public international law is 
beyond the scope of this article. It seems however to be generally acknowledged that 
an important function of general principles of law is to fill gaps in rules stemming 
from the other sources of international law.134 Therefore, if the exceptio is accepted 
as a general principle of law, it might applicable in order to fill possible gaps in 
responses to the breach of a treaty which are left by the VCLT or the ASR.135 
Some of these gaps are mentioned below. A question which arises is the 
following: what is the response to the breach of a treaty which is not material, so that 
Art 60 VCLT cannot apply, while at the same time does not constitute an 
internationally wrongful act, so that countermeasures cannot either apply? No 
relevant provision exists either in the VCLT or in the ASR. If the victim State does 
not decide to ignore the breach altogether because of its minor importance, the gap 
created could, in the case of synallagmatic treaty obligations, be covered by the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus,136 which, as already mentioned, does not require 
a material breach or an internationally wrongful act. In this way, the coherence 
among responses to the breach of a treaty is ensured. 
Gaps can also be found in the regulation of the procedure for the termination or 
suspension of the operation of a treaty in response to its material breach in Arts 65-8 
VCLT. According to Art 65 (1) VCLT, a party which, under the provisions of the 
VCLT, invokes a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation must 
notify the other parties of its claim. Under Art 65 (2) VCLT, if, after the expiry of a 
                                                 
133 See also Section 4.3; Ripert (n 2) p. 606; Nisot (n 1) p. 669.  
134 With regard to this function of general principles see ILC, Conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, ILCYB 2006-II para 19(a); Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources 
and Analogies of International Law (1927) p. 71 and analytically pp. 60-71; Bing Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987) pp. 1-26; Alain Pellet, 
“Article 38”, in A Zimmermann et al (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (2nd ed., 2012) pp. 850-3; Giorgio Gaja, “General Principles of Law”, MPEPIL online 
(last updated May 2013), available at  
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1410?rskey=Zp1QQj&result=2&prd=EPIL, accessed 18 April 2018, para 21.  
135 Zoller (n 8) pp. 17-8; similarly Giegerich (n 57) p. 1043, who at the same time warns against 
upsetting the balance of interests embodied in Art 60 VCLT. Contra Filippo Fontanelli, “The 
Invocation of the Exception of Non-Performance: A Case-Study on the Role and Application of 
General Principles of International Law of Contractual Origin” 1:1 CJICL (2012) pp. 128-9.    
    136 Forlati (n 94) p. 767. 
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period which, except in cases of special urgency, will not be less than three months 
after the receipt of the notification, no party has raised any objection or where it does 
not reply to the claim, the party making the notification may carry out in the manner 
provided in Art 67 VCLT the measure which it has proposed.137 The phrase ‘except 
in cases of special urgency’ was intended ‘to provide for cases of sudden and serious 
breach of a treaty which might call for prompt reaction by the injured party to protect 
itself from the consequences of the breach’.138 It can be argued that only temporary 
measures can be taken in case of urgency139 and not the termination of the treaty. 
However, there can also be no unilateral suspension of the operation of the treaty, 
since according to Arts 60 and 65-8 and Annex VCLT suspension is submitted to the 
same procedural conditions as termination. Therefore, cases of special urgency are 
precisely the ones in which urgent countermeasures according to Art 52 (2) ASR or 
the exceptio non adimpleti contractus are needed, the latter in case of synallagmatic 
treaty obligations, as they offer a prompt reply to the material breach without the 
need for the victim party to comply with strict procedural conditions.140 This is a 
case of complementarity between responses according to the VCLT, the ASR and 
even according to the exceptio, which may thus fill a gap in the regulation of the 
VCLT.   
Moreover, the VCLT is silent on the question of the legal relations between the 
parties during the procedure of Arts 65-8 and Annex VCLT, namely whether the 
party or parties to the treaty invoking its material breach as a ground for its 
termination or suspension continue to be bound by their obligations under the treaty. 
In such a case, it is quite unlikely that the parties will agree on the provisional 
suspension of the treaty; therefore the treaty will most probably remain in force 
during the procedure.141 This may however be too cumbersome for the aggrieved 
party or parties: as the delegate of Uruguay, Jiménez de Aréchaga, noted during the 
first session of the Vienna Conference, such a solution ‘disregarded the principle 
                                                 
137 The same requirement exists in case of termination or suspension in accordance with leges 
speciales contained in a treaty (Art 67 (2) VCLT). 
138 Waldock, UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session (Vienna 26 March-24 May 
1968) UN Doc A/CONF.39/11 (‘Vienna Conference I’), p. 441 para 19.  
139 Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, “The Relationship between Reprisals and Denunciation or 
Suspension of a Treaty” 4 EJIL (1993) p. 351. 
140 Nisot (n 1) pp. 672-3; Frederic L Kirgis Jr., “Some Lingering Questions about Article 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” 22 Cornell International Law Journal (1989) p. 568. 
141 Waldock II, draft art 25 (6). 
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inadimplenti non est adimplendum’.142 Therefore, since the treaty remains in force, 
the non-defaulting State might take countermeasures143 or even resort to the 
exceptio, the latter in case of synallagmatic treaty obligations.144 These two 
responses enable the non-defaulting party not to perform during this procedure its 
obligations under the treaty which remain without counterpart.   
In some of the above-mentioned cases, the exceptio has been referred to as an 
alternative to countermeasures, therefore it might be argued that it is not necessary 
for filling the relevant gaps. It might be envisaged though that the international legal 
system might reach a stage at which resort to countermeasures will be severely 
restricted or even prohibited; in such a case, should a party to a treaty be required to 
comply with its obligations which are synallagmatic to those which are not 
performed by the defaulting party until, for instance, an international organ is seized 
of the dispute?  
In any case, notions which could be considered as general principles of law should 
perhaps not be discarded from the quiver of international law, as they might prove 
useful. 
 
4.3  Subsidiary Means 
  
4.3.1 Judicial Decisions 
 
This section will examine the case law of international courts and tribunals 
concerning the exceptio. This principle has been advanced by States in their 
pleadings as a means of responding to the breach of a treaty alternative to the 
suspension of the operation of the treaty or its non-performance as a countermeasure. 
Nevertheless, with some exceptions,145 so far judicial or arbitral organs have not 
expressly applied it and it has been considered mainly in individual opinions of 
judges involved in the relevant cases. 
                                                 
142 Vienna Conference I, p. 356 para 38. 
143 Fitzmaurice II, 32, draft art 20 (4); Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(2nd ed., 1984) pp. 188-9. 
144 Nisot (n 1) pp. 672-3; Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, “International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century” 159 Recueil des Cours de l’ Académie de Droit International (1978) p. 81; Giegerich (n 57) 
p. 1034.  




The first case was the Meuse case brought before the PCIJ by the Netherlands 
against Belgium. Belgium in its Rejoinder had asked the Court, as an alternative to 
its other submissions, to declare that, by constructing certain works contrary to the 
terms of the 1863 Treaty146 between them concerning the regime of diversions of 
water from the river Meuse, the Netherlands had forfeited the right to invoke the 
Treaty against it.147 Therefore, Belgium invoked, though not explicitly, the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus as a response to the alleged breach by the Netherlands. The 
PCIJ decided that there had been no breach of the Treaty by either Belgium or the 
Netherlands.148 Nevertheless, it noted that the Netherlands was not warranted in 
complaining of the construction and operation of a lock of which itself set an 
example in the past.149 This might be considered as an implicit acceptance of the 
force of the argument put forward by Belgium, based on the exceptio. 
However, the principle found express support in two of the individual opinions 
attached to the decision. Judge Anzilotti in his Dissenting Opinion declared that the 
principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum150  
…is so just, so equitable, so universally recognized that it must be applied in 
international relations also. In any case, it is one of these “general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations” which the Court applies in virtue of Article 
38 of its Statute.151  
Judge Hudson in his Individual Opinion, referring to the principle of equity in 
common law as well as to civil law sources, also endorsed the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus (albeit emphasising the need for its cautious application) and considered 
it as a general principle of law.152 It might be noted that the case in question 
concerned a bilateral treaty between the two parties and the relevant obligations were 
of a synallagmatic character.153  
The applicability of the exceptio was also accepted in individual opinions of 
Judges of the ICJ, and more specifically by Judge de Castro in his Separate Opinions 
                                                 
146 127 CTS 435. 
147 The Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Judgment of 28 June 1937) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 
70 4, p. 8. 
    148 Ibid, p. 32. 
149 Ibid, p. 25. 
150 Nevertheless, seen in context, the statement refers to the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 
151 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, ibid, p. 50. 
152 Individual Opinion of Judge Hudson, ibid, p. 77. 
153 Contra Separate Opinion of Judge Altamira, ibid, p. 43. 
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in the Namibia154 and ICAO Council cases155 and by Judge Schwebel in his 
dissenting opinion in the judgement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.156  
The exceptio was invoked expressly in the recent case between FYROM and 
Greece in 2011. In this case FYROM claimed that Greece had breached the 1995 
Interim Accord between the Parties to the dispute.157 As an alternative to its main 
argument that it had complied with its obligations under the Interim Accord, Greece 
claimed that any failure to comply with its obligations could be justified, inter alia, 
on the basis of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus and it invoked a series of 
breaches of the Interim Accord by FYROM. 
  With regard to the exceptio, Greece took the position that it is a principle of general 
international law158 and that it is distinct from Art 60 VCLT159 and rooted in the law 
of State responsibility and not in the law of treaties.160 However, in the oral 
proceedings it argued that the exceptio is reflected in both Art 60 VCLT and 
countermeasures.161 By contrast, FYROM argued that Art 60 VCLT provides a 
complete set of rules and procedures governing responses to material breaches under 
the law of treaties and that the exceptio is not recognised as justifying non-
performance under the law of State responsibility.162  
The Court considered that Greece had failed to meet the minimum condition 
common to all three defences invoked by it, namely to demonstrate a connection 
between its response and any breach by FYROM,163 and that for this reason it was 
unnecessary for it to determine whether the doctrine of the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus formed part of contemporary international law.164 
                                                 
154 Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 170, p. 213. 
155 Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council 
(Judgment) [1972] ICJ Rep 116, pp. 128 footnote 1, 129.    
156 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 259 paras 240, 269, who 
however does not distinguish it clearly from the ‘clean hands’ doctrine (see ibid, para 270). 
157 1891 UNTS 7. Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 195 (the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia v Greece) (‘FYROM v Greece’) [2011] ICJ Rep 644 paras 12, 21. 
158 FYROM v Greece (Rejoinder of Greece) para 8.9. 
159 Ibid, para 8.6. 
160 Ibid, para 8.13. 
161 Pellet, Agent for Greece, FYROM v Greece, Oral Proceedings, 25 March 2011 at 15.00, CR 
2011/10 para 39.  
162 FYROM v Greece (Reply of FYROM) (9 June 2010) para 5.7.  
163 FYROM v Greece para 123. 
164 Ibid, para 161.  
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However, the exceptio was examined by judges in their individual opinions. Judge 
Simma in his Separate Opinion criticised the Court for not going into the heart of the 
matter in order to clarify the legal status of the exceptio and its relationship with the 
other defences invoked by Greece.165 Although he did not seem to dispute the 
character of the exceptio as a general principle of law according to Art 38 (1)(c) of 
the ICJ Statute,166 he emphasised the dangers posed by its unilateral character167 and 
he took the position that Art 60 VCLT has exhaustively regulated the legal 
consequences of treaty breach, leaving no place for the exceptio.168 
By contrast, Judge ad hoc Roucounas in his Dissenting Opinion, pointing out the 
support for the exceptio in the individual opinions of PCIJ and ICJ judges, took the 
position that the exceptio is a general principle of law according to Art 38 (1)(c) of 
the ICJ Statute which retains its separate existence: Art 60 VCLT does not deprive 
the injured party of the right to invoke the exceptio, particularly since it does not 
provide for every response to the breach of a treaty.169 Judge Bennouna in his 
Declaration also supported the applicability of the exceptio.170  
This case signified the first time that the responding State invoked expressly and 
alternatively all three possible responses to the breach of a treaty: the exceptio as the 
response with the less strict conditions of application, countermeasures and the 
response with the strictest conditions of application, namely the suspension of the 
operation of the treaty. One of the main characteristics of this judgment is that the 
Court avoided dealing with the relationship between these three responses to treaty 
breaches and also more specifically with the question of whether the exceptio is a 
rule of international law; however, there was a stark contrast of views on this issue, 
reflected in the separate opinions of Judges of the case. 
The exceptio, referred to as principle of reciprocity, was also invoked by Judge 
Ameli in his dissenting opinion in the INA Corporation v Iran award of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal,171 who interestingly considered that it applies ‘by operation of 
general public international law, irrespective of whether or not it is a term of the 
                                                 
165 Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, FYROM v Greece [2011] ICJ Rep 695 para 6.  
166 Ibid, para 12. 
167 Ibid, para 13. 
168 Ibid, paras 21, 22, 29.  
169 Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Roucounas, FYROM v Greece [2011] ICJ Rep 720 para 29.  
170 Declaration of Judge Bennouna, FYROM v Greece [2011] ICJ Rep 709 (ibid, 1). 




relevant treaty or other agreement’.172 In other words, he seemed to consider it as 
customary international law.  
Nevertheless, there have been cases in which international courts or tribunals have 
impliedly or expressly referred to the exceptio. Apart from the obiter dictum of the 
PCIJ in the Meuse case, there was implied reference to the exceptio in the Air 
Services Agreement arbitral award. The US response to the alleged breach of the Air 
Services Agreement by France could be considered as application of the exceptio, 
since in its Memorial the US described its response as ‘…a limited withdrawal of 
rights of French carriers corresponding to the rights denied the United States 
carrier’.173 Nevertheless, the US in its Memorial invoked expressly in justification of 
its action only countermeasures and their conditions of application, namely 
proportionality and the procedural conditions, therefore the Tribunal examined only 
the defence of countermeasures. It should be noted though that the Tribunal referred 
to the possibility that the measure at issue could ‘bear on a simple principle of 
reciprocity measured in economic terms,’174 which appears to be a reference to the 
notion of the exceptio. 
In another context, in the Application of the ‘IMESI’ (Internal Specific Tax) to the 
Trade in Cigarettes case, Uruguay invoked the exceptio against Paraguay. 
Nevertheless, the ad hoc MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal in its award seemed to 
confuse it with Art 60 VCLT in requiring a material breach; moreover, it expressed 
reservations with regard to its application in international law, particularly in 
multilateral treaties establishing regional integration organisations, creating a 
common market.175 It is true that it is doubtful that the exceptio could apply in such 
treaties, as it has also been accepted with regard to the treaties establishing the 
EU;176 nevertheless, this does not preclude its application in bilateral or 
bilateralisable treaties creating synallagmatic obligations. Similarly, although 
Argentina seems to have invoked the exceptio in the Argentina-Poultry Anti-
                                                 
172 Ibid, p. 434. 
173 Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France case 
(hereinafter ‘Air Services Agreement’) (1978) 18 RIAA 417 para 18.  
174 Ibid, para 78. 
175 Laudo VIII del Tribunal Arbitral "Ad Hoc" del MERCOSUR constituido para decidir en la 
controversia entre la República del Paraguay a la República Oriental del Uruguay  
sobre la "Aplicación del "IMESI" (Impuesto Específico Interno) a la Comercialización de 
Cigarrillos", 21 May 2002 
<http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/VIII%20LAUD
O.pdf> , pp. 6-7, accessed 18 April 2018. 
176 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastinghen [1963] ECR 1, 12. 
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dumping Duties case, by arguing, inter alia, that other members of the WTO had 
been engaging in the conduct of which it was accused, the WTO Panel seems to have 
rejected this argument by stating that the dispute before it concerned only 
Argentina’s conduct.177 It has been argued that the exceptio has no place in a 
multilateral treaty such as that establishing the WTO, ‘since this principle has, unless 
explicitly agreed otherwise, its place in bilateral contractual relationships only.’178 
Lastly, several international arbitral tribunals have applied or accepted the 
applicability of the exceptio as a general principle of law; although they did not 
strictly deal with it as a response to the breach of a treaty.  
For instance, there was application of the exceptio in the Sapphire International 
Petroleums Ltd. v National Iranian Oil Company arbitral award.179 The applicable 
law in the case were ‘the principles of law generally recognized by civilized 
nations’180 and the arbitrator took the view that the exceptio is such a principle, 
which is to be found both in civil and common law.181  
Moreover, there was express reference to and application of the exceptio by an 
ICSID tribunal in the Klöckner v Cameroon case. The Tribunal applied the exceptio 
in favour of the respondent State as a ground for the termination of the obligation, 
considering it as a general principle of law.182 However, the award was later 
annulled by a decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, which took the view that the 
exceptio has instead a suspensive effect and which did not apply the exceptio in the 
case.183 
There were also other ICSID tribunals accepting, in principle, the applicability of 
the exceptio in the relevant cases184 as well as a tribunal in an ad hoc arbitration 
                                                 
177 WTO, Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil- Report of the Panel 
(22 April 2003) WT/DS241/R [7.79]. 
178 Mitsuo Matsushita et al (eds), The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy (3rd 
ed., 2015) p. 62. 
179 Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd v National Iranian Oil Company (Arbitral Award) 
(1963) 35 ILR 136, pp. 181-5, cited by Laly-Chevalier (n 46) p. 418. 
180 Ibid, p. 175. 
181 Ibid, pp. 182 and references therein, 183. 
182 Klöckner v Cameroon (Award), 114 ILR 152, pp. 210-2, examining French, English and 
international law. However, that decision involved the law of a State and not, directly, international 
law (ILC Report 1999, p. 78 para 335). 
183 Klöckner v Cameroon, Decision by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment 
by Klöckner, 3 May 1985 paras 170-1. 
184 See, indicatively, Azurix Corporation v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, 
Award, 14 July 2006 para 260; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award rendered after resubmission proceeding, 20 
August 2007 para 7.5.28.  
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under UNCITRAL rules.185 This was done on the basis that the exceptio constitutes a 
general principle of law. Nevertheless, in the Yukos case, although the respondent 
invoked the exceptio, the Tribunal constituted under Art 26 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules did not examine its application 
in the case, merely by noting its rejection by Judge Simma in his Separate Opinion in 
the FYROM v Greece case186 and without conducting any examination of the 
position of the principle in international law. 
In conclusion, there is uncertainty with regard to the position of the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus in international law also in the international jurisprudence. It 
has only been expressly relied on by two international tribunals (Sapphire 
International Petroleums Ltd. v National Iranian Oil Company and Klöckner v 
Cameroon (Award)). Of course, both awards concerned investor-State arbitration in 
which applicable law were general principles of law and which did not strictly 
involve the breach of a treaty. Furthermore, the legal nature of the exceptio, its 
relationship with other temporary responses to the breach of a treaty and its 
conditions of application have not been adequately clarified in the international 
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the exceptio is a response which 
has for long been invoked before international courts and tribunals and has never 
been expressly rejected by them. In fact, it has found implied support by the PCIJ in 
the Meuse case and by the arbitral tribunal in the Air Services Agreement case; 
moreover, with the exception of the separate opinion of Judge Simma in the FYROM 
v Greece case, it has found support in individual opinions of several PCIJ and ICJ 
judges (although admittedly some of the ICJ judges did not distinguish it clearly 
from the general principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum or from other 
doctrines, such as the clean hands doctrine). Lastly, although a considerable number 
of arbitral tribunals have in principle accepted the applicability of the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus in investment arbitration, following the separate opinion of 
                                                 
185 Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005 paras 176-184, without 
however applying it in the case on the ground that it did not concern simultaneous or conditional 
performance. It must be noted however that the Tribunal reserved its position with regard to ‘whether 
the exception of non-performance is a maxim of interpretation or a rule of international law’ (ibid, 
para 177). For relevant awards of the International Chamber of Commerce see Karton (n 130) pp. 
885-94. 
186 Yukos Universal Ltd. (UK- Isle of Man) v Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 227, 
UNCITRAL (Energy Charter Treaty), Final Award, 18 July 2014 para 1360. Similarly in the Veteran 
Petroleum Ltd (Cyprus) v Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 228, Final Award, 18 July 2014 
para 1360; Hulley Enterprises Ltd v Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 226, Final Award, 18 July 
2014 para 1360. 
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Judge Simma in the FYROM v Greece case some arbitral tribunals have disputed the 
continuing existence of the exceptio in international law, without expressly 
denouncing it. Most international courts or tribunals have considered it as a general 
principle of law, although the tribunal in Eureko v Poland reserved its position as to 
whether it is a maxim of interpretation or a rule of international law; it must be noted 
though that a view has been expressed (INA Corporation v Iran) that it also 
constitutes part of customary international law. 
Therefore, the international jurisprudence as a subsidiary means for the 
determination of a rule of international law does not clearly support or refute the 
proposition that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus is a rule of customary 
international law, which can be invoked in response to the breach of a treaty 
alternatively to Art 60 VCLT or countermeasures; nevertheless, it offers clear 
support for the view that it constitutes a general principle of law.  
 
4.3.2 Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists of the Various Nations 
 
Many authors have referred to the exceptio in their analyses of responses to the 
breach of a treaty,187 most of them considering it as a general principle of law.188 The 
same position has been taken, as already seen, by several members of the ILC. The 
view has also been supported that the exceptio is both a general principle of law and 
part of customary international law.189 Several authors have clearly distinguished it 
from the responses codified in Art 60 VCLT;190 and it has been pointed out that the 
exceptio is a way to overcome the restriction of Art 60 VCLT to material breaches of 
                                                 
187 Apart from the authors already cited in the previous analysis, see indicatively Emer De Vattel, 
The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns (1758, reprinted 2008) [202]; Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum (1749 reprinted 1964) [432]; McNair (n 46) p. 540, who refers to ‘retaliatory 
suspension of performance of corresponding provision of a treaty’; Jiménez de Aréchaga (n 144) p. 
81; Paul Reuter, Droit international public (1976) p. 131; Kirgis (n 140) p. 558; Sicilianos (n 69) pp. 
287-8 (cf ibid, pp. 36-40); Thirlway (n 47) p. 41, but cf Hugh Thirlway, The sources of international 
law (2014) p. 101, where the author does not seem to distinguish between the exceptio and the 
principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum; Alain Pellet and Alina Miron, “Sanctions” MPEPIL 
online (last updated August 2013) < 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e984?rskey=k2aLrK&result=1&prd=EPIL> para 4, accessed 18 April 2018. Judge Simma in his 
earlier writings also accepted the exceptio as a response to the breach of a treaty (see Bruno Simma, 
“Termination and Suspension of Treaties: Two Recent Austrian Cases” 21 GYIL (1978) p. 85). 
188 See for example Nisot (n 1) p. 669; Greig (n 1) p. 399. 
189 Giegerich (n 57) p. 1043, who nevertheless considers that Art 60 VCLT codifies and 
circumscribes the exceptio. 
190 See for instance Greig (n 1) pp. 320-1. 
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a treaty.191 Certainly, some of these publicists, representing various nationalities and 
legal traditions, can be considered as ranking among the most qualified publicists of 
the various nations. Of course, there are also other publicists, apart from those who 
have already been referred in the context of the ILC discussions, who do not seem to 
include the exceptio among possible responses to the breach of a treaty192 or who 
note the uncertainty regarding the status of the exceptio.193 Some of those again can 
be considered as among the most qualified publicists of the various nations. 
Therefore, again, this subsidiary source does not clarify the issue whether the 
exceptio can be considered as a rule of international law. Nevertheless, it is to be 
noted that an important number of publicists seem to accept the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus as a general principle of law and as a possible response to the 




The exceptio non adimpleti contractus has escaped the codification of the ILC both 
in the law of treaties and in the law of State responsibility, although in both cases 
there were proposals for its inclusion, either by Special Rapporteurs or by members 
of the ILC. Nevertheless, it should generally be accepted that it is a defence to the 
breach of a treaty which belongs to the law of treaties and which is distinct from both 
the termination and the suspension of the operation of a treaty according to Art 60 
VCLT and from countermeasures according to Arts 49 et seq ASR. There is still 
uncertainty with regard to its conditions of application, although its background in 
domestic contract laws, State practice and the works of the ILC offer some 
indications: it is restricted to the case of breach of synallagmatic treaty obligations- 
the synallagmatic character of which should be interpreted strictly- arising from 
bilateral or bilateralisable treaties; it is prohibited in cases of breach of integral (and 
arguably also of interdependent) treaty obligations; the principle of proportionality is 
                                                 
191 Gerhard Hafner, “The Drawbacks and Lacunae of the VCLT”, in G Hafner et al (eds), 
Völkerrecht und die Dynamik der Menschenrechte: Liber Amicorum Wolfram Karl (2012) pp. 421, 
431. 
192 See for instance Daniel P O’Connell, International Law (1970) Vol I, pp. 266-8; Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (7th ed., 2008) pp. 622-3; James Crawford, Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., 2012) pp. 391-2; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law 
(7th ed., 2014) pp. 686-7. See also Laly-Chevalier (n 46) pp. 415-426, who does not consider the 
exceptio as a rule of international law. 
193 Crawford (n 48) p. 678. 
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also applicable; and there do not seem to be procedural conditions attached to it. Of 
course, if it is accepted as a rule of international law, the conditions of application of 
the exceptio need to be clarified on the basis of State practice by an authoritative 
international organ.  
On the question of whether the exceptio constitutes a rule of current international 
law, there is overwhelming support for the view that the exceptio constitutes a 
general principle of law in the sense of Art 38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute, given the extensive 
comparative law background of the notion in domestic contract laws as well as the 
acceptance of the exceptio as a general principle of law in the case law of 
international courts and tribunals and by the greatest part of the doctrine. As such, as 
pointed out in this article, the exceptio can fill gaps in the regulation of responses to 
the breach of a treaty by the VCLT and ASR. Besides, if it is accepted that the non-
performance of a treaty obligation which is synallagmatic to that breached is not an 
internationally wrongful act, its justification on the basis of countermeasures is 
conceptually problematic.  
There is uncertainty as to whether the exceptio constitutes a rule of customary 
international law, although this article has shown that there is State practice on the 
matter which is not negligible and which seems to be combined with the element of 
opinio juris. Nevertheless, given also the existence of some pleadings or declarations 
by States which dispute the character of the exceptio as a rule of international law, 
such practice does not seem to be sufficiently widespread and systematic so as to 
give rise to a rule of customary international law under Art 38 (1)(b) ICJ Statute. In 
any event, such State practice shows that it is doubtful that the exceptio has been 
absorbed by either Art 60 VCLT or countermeasures. International jurisprudence and 
doctrine do not clearly support nor refute the argument that the exceptio is a rule of 
customary international law, although there is some implicit acceptance in the 
jurisprudence and an important part of the doctrine seems to consider it as a possible 
response to the breach of a treaty. 
This article does not dispute that the exceptio, as a possible unilateral response to 
the breach of a treaty, bears risks for treaty stability; nevertheless, it is arguably also 
a response pertinent to the nature of synallagmatic obligations. Such risks could 
perhaps be mitigated through clarification and restriction of its conditions of 
application instead of its rejection per se. 
 
